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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
TRIAL DE Novo VERSUS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE

Texas. In Board of Water Engineers v. Colorado River Municipal Water District' suit was filed by the Colorado River District
and the Cities of Big Spring and Odessa against the Board of

Water Engineers of Texas and the Martin County Underground
Water Conservation District. It is unnecessary to set out the facts
at length. For the purposes of this discussion it is adequate to
state that the trial in the district court resulted in a judgment that
the order of the Board designating a subdivision of Martin County
as a water district was invalid because not reasonably supported
by substantial evidence and that as a consequence the Martin
County District did not have legal existence and all of its rules
and regulations were void. The judgment enjoined the Martin
County District from enforcing its rules and regulations and from

interfering with plaintiffs' activities. From the judgment the Board
and the Martin County District perfected a direct appeal to the
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Hickman,
set the injunction aside and dismissed the case. The statute providing for appeals from orders of the Board of Water Engineers
and of underground water districts declares:
Such suit shall be advanced for trial and be determined as expeditiously as possible, and no postponement thereof or continuance shall
2
be granted except for reasons deemed imperative by the court.
1
2

Tex.---_ 254 S. W. 2d 369 (1953).
--Tax. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1950 Supp.) art. 7880-3c, § F.
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The court relied on this provision as evidencing an unmistakable
intent that suits attacking orders of the Board or underground
water districts must be brought within a reasonable time. It was
held that plaintiffs could not sue where seven months had passed
since the Board created the Martin County District and they had
tacitly recognized the District by meeting with its representatives.
The court felt that a different decision would violate the legislative intent that there should be no unnecessary delay in obtaining
review of the Board's orders.
Defendants were unsuccessful in challenging the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court. Their contention was that the validity of
the Board's order could be raised by direct appeal under Rule
4 99-a of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure only if the court had
enjoined the enforcement of the order. Since the injunction was
not against the enforcement of the Board's order but against the
enforcement of the rules and regulations of the Martin County
District, it was argued that direct appeal to the supreme court
did not lie. The court answered that while Subsection (b) of Rule
499-a might be susceptible to a construction favorable to defendants' contention, the court was not bound to look to a court rule
to determine its jurisdiction.
The constitutional amendment enlarging the jurisdiction of the
court to include cases brought to it by direct appeal reads:
The Legislature shall have the power to provide by law, for an appeal
direct to the Supreme Court of this State from an order of any trial
court granting or denying an interlocutory or permanent injunction

on the grounds of the . . . validity or invalidity of any administrative order issued by any state agency under any statute of this state. 3
The enabling statute is in the same language as the constitutional
amendment and declares that appeals may be taken directly to the
supreme court in the cases described.4 The purpose of the amend8TEx. CONST. Art. V, § 3-b.
7
4 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.

(Vernon, 1948) art. 1 38a.
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ment was to obtain a quick and final disposition of questions of
vital importance by passing over the courts of civil appeals and
taking cases by direct appeal to the supreme court. The question
of validity or invalidity of an order of a state board or commission was regarded by the legislature as being of sufficient importance to justify this departure from the normal process of appeal.
The instant case was held to be of the precise type where a
direct appeal was authorized by the constitutional amendment and
enabling statute. Rule 499-a was said to be susceptible of a construction consistent with this holding.
Justice Smedley dissented, asserting that the supreme court did
not have jurisdiction of the case on direct appeal. He emphasized
that the constitutional amendment provided for a direct appeal
"on the validity or invalidity of any administrative order issued
by any state agency under any statute of this state." His point was
that the injunction in this case was not granted on the invalidity
of an order of the Board but on the invalidity of the rules and
regulations of the Martin County District. He complained that the
majority opinion would lead to enlargement of the jurisdiction
of the supreme court by direct appeal. One may query whether
a distinction of substance was made between an injunction against
a Board order and an injunction against rules and regulations of
a district created by a void order of the Board.
Another ground upon which defendants based their motion to
dismiss was that direct appeal from an order of a state agency
is proper only in cases controlled by the substantial evidence rule.
The court did not deem it necessary to pass on this contention, but
held that the case was governed by the substantial evidence rule.
The statute providing for appeals to the district court from acts
and orders of the Board of State Engineers and underground water
districts states:
In all such trials the burden of proof shall be upon the party complaining of such law, rules, regulations or orders or act of the Board, and
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such law, rules, regulations or orders or act of the Board so complained
of shall be deemed prima-facie valid but the trial shall be de novo, and
the court shall determine independently all issues of fact and law with
respect to the validity and reasonableness of the law, rules, regulations
or orders or acts of the Board complained of.5

The question was whether this statute called into play the substantial evidence rule. The supreme court held that it did. The substantial evidence rule in Texas administrative law, broadly stated,
means that in all cases of direct attack upon administrative orders,
the trial court is limited to a determination of whether, from all
evidence presented before the court, the action of the administrative body is illegal, arbitrary, or capricious, or is not reasonably supported by substantial evidence.' In the principal case the
majority of the court thought that the statute was
. ..itself a statement of the substantial evidence rule. Under that rule
the court makes an independent determination from the evidence adduced at the trial of whether the administrative order is reasonably
supported by substantial evidence. The statute provides that the court
shall determine the reasonableness of the order. If an order is reasonsubstantial evidence it is reasonable; otherwise it
ably supported by
7
is unreasonable.
Justice Smedley, dissenting, thought that the case was not controlled by the substantial evidence rule. He noted that the major-

ity cited the cases of Fire Department of the City of Ft. Worth v.
City of Ft. Worth' and Jones v. Marsh.9 But the statutes in those
decisions were different from the one construed in the principal
case. The statute involved in the City of Ft. Worth case provided
that "such cases shall be tried de novo."' The statute construed
5TEX. Rav. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1950 Supp.) art. 7880-3c, §F.
6 Harris, A Reappraisalof the Substantial Evidence Rule in Texas Administrative
Law, 3 Southw. L. J. 416, 4,21, 422 (1949).
7254 S. W. 2d at 372.
8 147 Tex. 505, 217 S.W. 2d 664 (1949).
9 148 Tex. 362, 224 S. W. 2d 198 (1949).
10 TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 1269m, § 18.
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in the Marsh case said that "the trial shall be de novo under the
same rules as ordinary civil suits."" On the face of the statutes
in the two cases it would appear that an independent trial of the
facts and law in the district court was contemplated. Yet the substantial evidence rule was held applicable.
Neither of the statutes in the two cases cited provided, as does
the statute in the principal case, that "the trial shall be de novo,
and the court shall determine independently all issues of fact and
of law with respect to the validity and reasonableness of the...
orders or acts of the Board complained of." One writer has suggested that the legislature in providing for trials "de novo" or for
actions like "ordinary civil suits" has made its intent clear to
afford an independent trial of the issues determined by the administrative agency.'2 The cure for the substantial evidence rule, if
a cure is desired, is explicit amendment of the many statutes which
are susceptible to interpretation bringing the rule into play. 8
The dissent of Justice Smedley states that the term "de novo"
alone advances the thought that there shall be a new trial before
the district court. This interpretation is strengthened when the term
is coupled with an expression that the court shall determine all
issues of fact and law independently.
It appears that the majority opinion gives no effect to the expression that the trial court "shall determine independently all issues
of fact and law." The construction of the majority that the language of the statute in this case allows for a limited trial under
the substantial evidence rule is a strained one, as it does not seem
probable that the legislature intended any such limitation. From
the majority opinion it would seem that anything less than an
express statement in an appeal statute negativing application of
the substantial evidence rule will result in application of the rule.

I"Tax. PEN. CODE

(Vernon, 1948) art. 666-14.
Larson, The Substantial Evidence Rule- Texas Version, 5 Southw. L. J. 152,
159 (1951).
18 Id. at 167.
12
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There has been a reluctance on the part of courts generally to
meddle with administrative decisions, regardless of the wording
of the appeal statutes. The instant decision well illustrates this
judicial attitude.

TEMPORARY INJUNCTION-OPERATION

OF SUBSTANTIAL

EVIDENCE RULE

Texas. In Transport Co. o/ Texas v. Robertson Transports14 the
application of the substantial evidence rule to a suit for temporary
injunction against an administrative body was brought into question. Robertson Transports was a specialized motor carrier and
held a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing
it to transport "named chemicals" in trucks between all points
in Texas. It filed an application with the Railroad Commission to
amend the certificate so as to authorize the transport of "chemicals, liquid chemicals and chemical products" in trucks between
all points in Texas. After a hearing the Railroad Commission
granted the request.
The Transport Company of Texas and other carriers filed suit
seeking temporary and permanent injunctions against the Commission's order and a judgment declaring the order invalid. The
trial court granted temporary injunction. The court of civil appeals
reversed and dissolved the injunction on the ground that the trial
court's judgment did not set forth the reasons for the injunction
as required by Rule 683 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the temporary
injunction.
Rule 683 reads in part as follows: "Every order granting an
injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons
for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail and not by reference to the complaint or other doc14

----- Tex_..

261 S. W. 2d 549 (1953).
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ument, the act or acts sought to be restrained.... ." Rule 683 was
adopted from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5
The trial court's decree recited the following reasons for the
issuance of the temporary injunction: ". . . that if the defendant,
Robertson Transports, Inc., proceeds to operate under said order
...,he would interfere with the markets established by the plaintiffs and would probably divert freight tonnage and revenues from
the plaintiffs, that such interference with customers and markets
and diversion of freight tonnage and revenues would result in
irreparable and inestimable damages to the plaintiffs; that the
plaintiffs in said hearing have made a proper showing of a probable right and probable injury of the matters in the temporary
injunction prayed for.... ."
The supreme court stated that while there was little authority on the exact question presented, Rule 683 was mandatory. 6
On application for a temporary injunction the sole question before
the trial court is the right of the one seeking the injunction to a
preservation of the status quo until a final trial of the case on the
merits can be had. 7 To warrant issuance of the writ, the applicant
need only show a probable right and a probable injury; he need
not establish that it will be he who will generally prevail in the
litigation.'"
The trial court's decree contained an express finding that the
petitioners had made "a proper showing of a probable right and
a probable injury." The trial court further found that, if Robertson Transport Company were permitted to operate under the Railroad Commission's order, it "would interfere with the markets
established by the plaintiffs and... that such interference would
result in irreparable and inestimable damage to the plaintiffs."
The Supreme Court of Texas, reviewing the lower court's findings,
L5Rule 65(d).
16
17
18

Gonzales v. Rodriques, 250 S. W. 2d 253 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
James v. Weinstein & Sons, 12 S. W. 2d 959, 960 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929).
Rosenfield v. Siefert, 270 S. W. 220, 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
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held them to be a sufficient compliance with Rule 683. A federal
district court, in a bankruptcy matter, construed Rule 65(d) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is substantially identical with Rule 683. The court held that the mere recital that "irreparable damage may result" was a sufficient compliance with the
Rule.' 9
Defendants contended that the issue on appeal to the supreme
court was governed by the substantial evidence rule. They argued
that the judgment granting the temporary injunction should be
reversed if the record of the trial court reflected that the Commission's order was supported by substantial evidence. No authority was cited to sustain this contention. The court dismissed this
point, asserting that the usual and customary rules governing
appeals from temporary injunctions had been applied in reviewing similar decrees restraining the enforcement of administrative orders."0
The principal case is important because of the distinction that
is made between temporary and permanent injunctions. It is well
established that where the question of a permanent injunction is
before the reviewing court, the substantial evidence rule is to be
applied. 2 ' The principal case holds that this is not true in the
case of a temporary injunction.
Unlike a permanent injunction, which issues after a hearing
on the merits, the temporary injunction is preliminary to such
hearing and is in no way dependent thereon. A temporary injunction merely preserves the status quo until a final hearing. It seems
a little odd that administrative action may be stopped in a suit
for temporary injunction where it could not be stopped in a suit
for permanent injunction. The burden of the plaintiff in the for1o In re Rumsey Mfg. Corp. 9 F. R. D. 93 (W.D.N.Y. 1949).
20 Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co., 146 Tex. 286, 298, 206 S. W. 2d 235, 242,
243 (1947); Southwestern Greyhound Lines v. Railroad Commission, 128 Tex. 560,
572, 573, 99 S. W. 2d 263, 270 (1936).
21 Larson, The Substantial Evidence Rule- Texas Version, 5 Southw. L. J. 152
(1951).
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mer suit is easier to meet than in the latter. However, it is to be
remembered that the temporary injunction has limited duration.
Also, the substantial evidence rule is such that it cannot be applied
to less than all the evidence presented at a full hearing. The evidence at the final trial may be different from that presented at
the hearing on the temporary injunction.
The court had before it the question whether to apply the language of Rule 683 or to apply the substantial evidence rule. Since
the Rule deals specifically with temporary injunctions, it is submitted that the court had no choice but to decide as it did. The
express words of the Rule must be regarded as controlling, and
one must agree that the time had not yet come for the substantial
evidence rule to operate.

TEXAS MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY-RESPONSIBILITY

ACT

CONSTITUTIONALITY

Texas. Gillaspie v. Department of Public Safety2 was a case
in which James D. Gillaspie, a fifteen-year-old minor, was driving
an automobile owned by his father when he collided with two
other vehicles causing personal injuries and property damage in
excess of $100. He had the permission of his father in driving
the automobile. Both father and son had driver's licenses. But
neither had liability insurance or had deposited any type of security as permitted by the Texas Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act." The Act provides that an operator of a motor vehicle
involved in an accident, regardless of blame, must report it to
the Department of Public Safety within ten days if any person is
killed or injured or if damage is inflicted to the property of any
one person in excess of $100.
After receipt of the report, the Department must determine the
22
22

-----Tex.-------, 259 S. W. 2d 177 (1953).
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1952 Supp.) art. 6701h.
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amount of security which is sufficient in its opinion to satisfy any
judgment resulting from the accident. Within sixty days after
the receipt of the accident report, the Department must suspend
(1) the license of the operator of the car and (2) the motor
vehicle registration of the owner unless the operator or owner
or both deposit security in the sum determined by the Department. The Act further declares that security or suspension is not
required if the owner and operator (1) have been released from
liability, or (2) have been finally adjudicated not liable, or
(3) have executed a duly acknowledged written agreement providing for the payment of an agreed amount in installments with
respect to all claims for injuries or damages resulting from the
accident. The security and suspension provisions do not apply
when the operator or owner of the car has in effect at the time
of the accident a liability policy with respect to the motor vehicle
involved in the accident.
In the principal case, since neither the operator nor the owner
of the car had liability insurance, the Department suspended the
automobile registration of the owner of the car and the driver's
license of the owner's son. The case was appealed. After hearing
evidence, the county court found that the father was not at fault
or liable for the injuries and damages. In accordance with this
finding it set aside the suspension order as to the owner of the car
and affirmed the action of the Department as to the driver. The
court of civil appeals reversed the judgment as to the owner of
the automobile and upheld the Department's suspension of the
automobile registration. The Supreme Court of Texas in a well
considered opinion by Justice Smedley affirmed the court of civil
appeals in all respects.
The Act has a two-fold purpose: first, to stimulate accident prevention and, second, to provide financial protection to the public
against the negligent driving of others.24 The court observed that
the Act does not require one to have liability insurance or other
24

Townsend, Motor Vehicle Act, 14 Tex. B. J. 681 (1951).
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security as a condition precedent to obtaining a license or using
the highways. Instead, it requires the depositing of adequate security after an accident, in order to protect Texas citizens against
financially irresponsible owners or operators of motor vehicles.
Many states have similar laws, and they have usually been sustained against various constitutional attacks.25
In the case at bar the petitioner contended that the Act, in permitting suspension of license and registration without first determining the question of liability, violated constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection. The court met this
argument by setting forth the well-established principle that the
licensing of drivers is a grant of a privilege and not of a right.26
The privilege is subject to reasonable regulation by the state in
the interest of public safety and welfare, and such reasonable
regulation may be committed to an administrative body for
enforcement. This is especially true when judicial review is provided for, as in this Act. In Ballow v. Reeves2 7 the Kentucky court
stated,
It seems clear that the legislature may require, as a condition to the
right of operating a motor vehicle, the procurement of insurance or
the furnishing of other proof of financial responsibility....

"If the legislature may require proof of financial responsibility in
advance of the issuance of a license, there seems to be no valid reason

why it could not require the same thing of an operator who had been
involved in an accident, as the condition upon which he will be peritted to retain his license.
In Rosenblum v Griffin2" the court held constitutional the part
of a statute authorizing suspension of a license without a finding
of fault or liability. While recognizing that it may be unjust for
an operator to lose his license though not at fault, the court felt
25Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N. H. 314, 197 At. 701 (1938).
26 Taylor v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. Rep. 568, 209 S. W. 2d 191 (1948).
27238 S. W. 2d 141, 142 (Ky. 1951 ).
2889 N. H. 314, 197 Atd. 701, 704 (1938).
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that the statute established "conditions which are definite and conclusive in meeting the need of prompt action."
The petitioner contended that he was denied due process in the
Department's fixing the amount of security and ordering suspension of the owner's registration certificate prior to a hearing. The
Act does not require a hearing before suspension, although Section 2(a) states that the Department shall provide for hearings
upon request of persons aggrieved by its orders or acts. The record did not indicate that the petitioners requested a hearing. Since
the driver's license and registration are not property rights but
rather privileges, regulation of their issuance or cancellation may
be committed to an administrative body or agency.
Ample protection against abuse of administrative authority is
assured by Section 2(b) and (c) of the Act, which provides that
an order or act of the Department may be appealed to the county
court. Thus, the requirements of due process are more than
satisfied. The Act further provides that the substantial evidence
rule is not to be invoked or to apply, but that the trial shall be
de novo without regard to any prior holding of fact or law by
the Department.
The petitioners also argued that the Act was invalid because
it delegated the Department authority to determine the amount
of security required to be deposited without prescribing a sufficient
standard. This point was dismissed by the court. It was said that
the established rules and principles governing the recovery of
judgments for damages are matters of public knowledge and provide a reasonable and sufficient standard for the Department and
that ample protection against unreasonable action by the Department in fixing the amount of the security is given by the statutory
provisions for appeal and trial de novo.
It would seem clear that the Texas Motor Vehicle SafetyResponsibility Act and other similar statutes are designed to pro-
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tect travelers upon the highway, and hence are not violative of
any constitutional guaranty.29 The instant decision is in line with
the great weight of authority.
Donald Mopsik.

29 6 BLASHFIELD'S CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW & PRACTICE

(1945) § 3992.

